Introduction
Max Planck hoped that all statistical laws, especially the law of entropy could (and should) be ultimately reducible to dynamical laws:
I believe and hope that a strict mechanical signifi cance can be found for the second law along this path, but the problem is obviously extremely diffi cult and requires time. Many fundamental laws of physics (of Classical Mechanics, of Special Relativity, of Quantum Mechanics) are invariant w.r.t time reversal; i.e. in a diff erential equation like that of Newton´s second law of motion (for Classical Mechanics) or that of Schrödinger for Quantum Mechanics, one can replace the sign t (for time) by −t without making the law invalid.
2 Th e underlying view about dynamical laws is illustrated by the famous quotation from Laplace: We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the eff ect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it -an intelligence suffi ciently vast to submit these data to analysis -it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. 3 Th e dynamical law describes the time development of a physical system S in such a way that the following condition D1 is satisfi ed:
D1 Th e state of the physical system S at any given time t i is a defi nite function of its state at an earlier time t i-1 . A unique earlier state (corresponding to a unique solution of the diff erential equation) leads under the time evolution to a unique fi nal state (again corresponding to a unique solution of the equation).
But D1 is not satisfi ed in statistical laws, like those of thermodynamics or those describing processes of radiation: A unique later state S 2 at t 2 is not a defi nite function of an earlier state S 1 at t 1 . Th e same initial state may lead to diff erent successor states (branching). According to Prigogine this is a sign that the laws of physics are still incomplete since many processes are irreversible in time. 4 Feynman expresses his view quite directly:
Next we mention a very interesting symmetry which is obviously false, i.e., reversibility in time.
5
Th e world view underlying Laplace's quotation was based on the belief that all physical systems are -if analysed in their inmost structure -ultimately mechanical systems. Since a clock was understood as a paradigm example of a mechanical system, the main thesis of the mechanistic world view could be expressed by saying that all complex systems (things) of the world -even most complicated ones like gases, swarms of mosquitoes, or clouds -are ultimately (i.e., if we would have enough knowledge of the detailed interaction of the particles ) clocks. Or, put in the words Popper used in his A. H. Compton Memorial Lecture: "All clouds are clocks" 6 After the discovery of statistical laws in thermodynamics and later in other areas, there was a general doubt with respect to the mechanistic and 3 Laplace (1814), ch. 2 4 Cf. Prigogine (1993) . 5 Feynman (1997 ), p. 28. 6 Popper (1965 deterministic interpretation of the world. One of the fi rst philosophers who noticed that a certain imperfection in all "clocks" allows to enter chance and randomness was Charles Sanders Peirce. 7 Th e question was now: Could it not be the case that all laws are statistical and the deterministic outlook is only on the surface of macroscopic phenomena? Th at is, all complex systems (things) of the world are in fact -in their inmost structure, i.e. on the atomic level -like gases or swarms of mosquitoes or clouds. Th is led to another extreme picture discussed by Popper: "All clocks are clouds". 8 But neither of these extreme pictures -reduction to dynamical laws "all clouds are clocks" or reduction to statistical laws "all clocks are clouds" -proved satisfactory as an explanation of everything. Th e heroic ideal to explain everything by one (or one kind of ) principle had to be replaced by the aim to fi nd relatively few (kinds of ) principles (laws) for relatively many facts.
Experimental facts
Keeping the laws (time-reversal) symmetric and putting the responsibility for the time asymmetric phenomena into the initial or boundary conditions leads to explanations like the following ones: the thermodynamic asymmetry presupposes progenitor states far from the equilibrium; the CP asymmetry presupposes a spontaneous symmetry breaking of the Hamiltonian; the expansion of the universe presupposes a special singularity (big bang), etc.
However, many authors have also discussed time-symmetric models of the universe.
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In this case the universe undergoes expansion and contraction in a symmetric way such that we have periodicity. However there are at least two diffi culties: Th e improbable recurrence and the T-violation in weak interactions. Th e fi rst is expressed by the following quotation:
Th e diffi culty with the time-symmetric models is their implausibility. Th ey require a very fi nely tuned set of boundary conditions, for which no explanation is off ered.
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Th e second is that since CPT (charge-parity-time) invariance (of laws) is 7 Peirce (1960 ) ch. 6.47. 8 Popper (1965 ). 9 Gell-Mann, Hartle, (1994 ), ch. 22.5. 10 Haliwell (1994 generally satisfi ed -all fundamental fi eld equations are CPT invariant -but CP invariance is slightly violated in weak interactions, T has to outbalance the diff erence. Th erefore T invariance (time-reversal invariance) is not completely satisfi ed for the fundamental laws of nature.
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CPT invariance -one of the most important symmetries of Quantum Field Th eory -says that physical laws seem to be symmetric with respect to the complex exchange of particle-antiparticle, right-left and past-future. Th is CPT symmetry has remarkable consequences: It implies that the mass of (any) particle must be the same as that of its respective antiparticle. Th e same holds for their lifetimes. Th eir electric charges must have the same magnitude but opposite signs, their magnetic moments must agree.
Moreover as it appears from recent experiments T-reversal symmetry seems to be violated directly, too, and not only via CPT symmetry and CP violation. Th e violation concerns weak interactions. But since weak interaction concerns all elementary particles except photons the experimental result appears to be very important. Th ere have been two diff erent series of experiments independently made at CERN 12 and FERMILAB 13 which seem to prove the violation. Th e experiment made at CERN concerns time dependent rates for the strangeness-oscillation process with neutral kaons which are diff erent for K° → −K° and its inverse −K° → K°. Th e experiment made at FERMILAB is of a more complicated structure.
Non recurrence versus irreversibility
Skiing in fresh powder snow is a great pleasure. But if the slope is small and one is skiing down frequently, the slope will be fi lled with traces and after some time no new space (powder snow) is left and thus one has to use one's own traces again (recurrence). Th is illustration tells us already some important conditions: Th e motion has to be area-preserving (the skier is not supposed to leave the slope) and in a fi nite region. Observe now that just by raising the complexity of the system recurrence becomes very improbable: Imagine that there are thousands of skiers on the slopes (the cable 11 Th is holds, provided there are no other ways out; for instance that the T-violation is not due to an asymmetry in the cosmological boundary conditions or to an asymmetry of our particular epoch and spatial location. Cf. Gell-Mann, Hartle (1994) , p. 329. 12 Angelopoulos et al. (1998 ). 13 Schwarzschild (1999 cars and lifts of a big ski region in Austria can take up about 60,000 people per hour). Th e probability that at some later time all skiers would be in the same position again such that the whole state of this system would recur has much lower probability.
Boltzmann's example
Instead of living organisms take the molecules in a litre of gas (air) at temperature T = 0°C (273 K) and atmospheric pressure (1.033·10 3 g/cm 2 ). A litre of air (at temperature and pressure mentioned) consists of 2.688·10 22 molecules. It will be understandable that this system of 2.688·10 22 molecules can be in a huge number of diff erent (micro-)states. Th e number is about 10 5•10 22 so as to realise the macrostate "litre of air under the conditions mentioned". Th us the same (for our lungs the same) macrostate can be realised by a huge number of diff erent microstates. Boltzmann's discovery was that the probability of such a macrostate can be defi ned as the number of microstates which can realise the macrostate and that this number (more accurately the logarithm of it) is the entropy.
We might ask the following questions: Will all the 10 5•10 22 microstates of the litre of air be realised at all? And in what time? Th is leads to an interesting cosmological question: Assume that we are asking how many possible microstates are in the whole universe in order to calculate the entropy of the whole universe. Th en the question arises whether every microstate can be realised within the life time of the universe, if the life time is fi nite. Since the number of microstates is extremely huge they probably will not all be realisable within the life time calculated by the Standard (Big Bang) Th eory. If this is so, then there are more possible universes than the actual universe, which obey the same laws of nature and diff er from each other only w.r.t. some microstates. In other words the laws of nature have more (possible) models than the one actually realised.
Irreversibility locally violated
Schrödinger raised the question: How can we understand a living system in terms of Boltzmann's theory? 14 Or, how can these systems manage to keep, or even to increase, a low entropy level despite of the validity of the law of entropy? Th e answer, which was partially already given by Schödinger, includes the following points: from their environment via metabolism, but they pass on low-grade energy (energy with high entropy). (iii) By process (ii) the living systems are capable of achieving orthogenesis (maturation), i.e. increasing order, quality, and diff erentiation.
Cosmological investigations show that also planets, especially the earth, behave in a similar way as living systems. It receives high grade energy as electromagnetic radiation (with Planck-temperature of 5600 Kelvin) from the sun and passes on low-grade energy as heat radiation (with Planck-temperature of only about 300 Kelvin) into its environment. From the above considerations it will be understandable that we want to avoid the term 'irreversibility' for three reasons:
(i) What thermodynamic processes -and many others like radiation, cosmological expansion, processes of measurement, biological and psychological processes -really show is that recurrence of the state of the whole system is very improbable but not that recurrence or time reversal is impossible. (ii) From the last example described, it is plain that thermodynamic processes can be reversed locally without violating the second law. (iii) Moreover one can show independently that non-recurrence and timeirreversibility are not equivalent notions: since we have cases of nonrecurrent phase density and time reversibility in chaotic motion of dynamical chaos.
Summing up
Th e diff erence between dynamical and statistical laws which is usually viewed as the most striking one -time-reversal invariance of the laws versus irreversibility of the laws -has to be taken with care. Strict time-reversal symmetry is no longer valid on the microlevel and irreversibility on the macrolevel should be better replaced by very improbable recurrence. However, the diff erences in this respect are suffi ciently large to forbid reducibility of one type of law to the other. But the more careful interpretation paves the way for the compatibility of both types of laws.
Is the "arrow of time" compatible with dynamical laws?
We shall discuss this question w.r.t. three diff erent descriptions of time (a)-(c).
(a) Time fl ows
Th at time fl ows we grasp from change, mutation and movement (i) w.r.t. to an ordered sequence (ii).
(i) Without any change time would "stand still" such that change is a necessary condition of time -at least for our understanding: "It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction, at which we arrive by means of the changes of things."
15
Th at time presupposes change was already pointed out by Aristotle in his defi nition of time. 16 Cf. also Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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Th at there is no past to future direction of time in regions that are at equilibrium was pointed out by Boltzmann. 18 He compared this with gravitation: As there is no downward direction in regions of space where there is no (net) gravitational force, there is also no past to future direction of time in regions that are at equilibrium.
(ii) Th us it seems better to speak of the asymmetry of a fl owing process of a sequence of successive states which are ordered by a partial ordering instead of a "fl owing time". In such a sequence we distinguish past and future states and we measure the distance between them with the help of time units (produced by another physical periodic process in a clock).
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Th e presupposed ordered sequence is best described by the chronology of time or by the basic axioms of tense logic which assume partial ordering, transitivity, antisymmetry, irrefl exibility and density.
Newton's interpretation:
Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, fl ows equably without relation to anything external … 20 15 Mach, E. (1933) 
Einstein's interpretation in GR:
Th e relative time of an observer plus reference frame is measured by standard clocks. By stipulation it fl ows equably but it depends on the distribution of matter, fi elds, and boundary conditions. Every observer plus reference frame has its own time scale and there is no universal time scale that is relevant for all observers.
In analogy to Newton we may paraphrase Einstein's interpretation thus: "Relative, true and physical time … fl ows equably only locally, but in general it fl ows unequably with relation to something external i.e. to the distribution of matter, fi elds and boundary conditions."
(b) Time fl ows only in one direction
Th e subsequent considerations in (b) and (c) will show that the frequently used expression of the "arrow of time" is misleading; the arrow is intrinsic in process (not "in" time).
Concerning the question of how to distinguish a (particle's) movement on a spatial coordinate (in GR: space geodesic) from a (particle's) movement on a time coordinate (in GR: either time-like geodesic or null geodesic 21 ), we may formulate two subquestions: (α) Can the coordinates (geodesics) be distinguished by their directions (vectors)? (β) Can the coordinates (geodesics) be distinguished by their closure conditions? Both questions can be answered with: Yes. Th e answer to the fi rst subquestion is very well expressed by the following quotation from Wigner: "Th e diff erence between the two cases arises from the fact that a particle's world line can cross the t = constant line only in one direction (in the direction of increasing t); it can cross the x = constant line in both directions."
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Th e answer to the second subquestion is the following: According to GR, the space of the universe is closed (even if the universe is expanding); that is, there are closed spatial coordinates or closed space-like geodesics. On the other hand, we usually assume that the time coordinate is not closed; i.e., we assume that the non-space-like geodesics (time-like geodesics and null geodesics) are not closed. Th is assumption has been called the chronology condition of spacetime 23 . Th is condition plays an important role for the concept of causality. Causality would break down and one could travel into one's own past, if the chronology condition is not satisfi ed.
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Th e fact, that the time coordinate is distinguished from the spatial coordinates such that a particle´s world line can cross the t = constant line only in the positive direction of increasing t, is not determined by dynamical laws; because dynamical laws permit both directions, positive and negative. From this, it follows that (b), i.e. time fl ows in one direction, is compatible with dynamical laws, because dynamical laws allow both directions.
(c) Time is connected with directional processes
In addition to the directional feature of time described in (b) which is not at all in confl ict with dynamical laws, there are two further features of time which are connected with directional processes.
(i) Assume a very large (long) but fi nite sequence of decimal places after 0, say the (fi nite) sequence of natural numbers, i.e. 0, 1 2 3 … 10 11 12 … 99 100 101 … etc. It can be proved that this sequence has a normal distribution. It will therefore be easily understandable that the probability of recurrence for the three numbers 1, 4, 2 (in this order) on decimal places will be not very low. It occurs in 142, in 1420, 1421 etc. In contradistinction to that the probability of the recurrence of an ordered sequence of 10 10 numbers on decimal places as part of the above sequence will be very much lower. Th is has nothing to do with entropy or with the increasing of a certain physical magnitude. But it has to do with "direction" and asymmetry.
(ii) Directional processes: First it should be clear that chronological time scales as they are used for time measurement do not defi ne a direction of time even if they indicate that "time fl ows" in the sense of representing a sequence of partial ordering. Assuming events (states) S 1 , S 2 , … (∈ S), reference frames plus observer, RF, and chronometrical scales CS (mappings of durations onto real numbers, standard clock) the following postulates are basic for time T and time interval t: α) T is a function {S 1 , S 2 , RF, CS} → ℜ + with T {S 1 , S 1 , RF, CS} = 0 β) For every state S 1 relative to RF and CS, and for any value t ∈ ℜ + there exists a second state S 2 such that T (S 1 , S 2 , RF, CS) = t γ) Transitivity. For any triple of states (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) relative to RF and CS it holds T (S 1 , S 2 , RF, CS) + T(S 2 , S 3 , RF, CS) = T (S 1 , S 3 , RF, CS) From these postulates it follows that for any two events S 1 S 2 relative to RF and CS it holds that: T (S 1 , S 2 , RF, CS) = −T (S 2 , S 1 , RF, CS). Th is shows clearly that the above basic assumptions and postulates do not defi ne a direction "in" time. Th ey tell us only that the direction from S 1 to S 2 is the opposite of the direction from S 2 to S 1 ; but not which event is fi rst in nature.
On the other hand so-called directional processes (of nature) tell us unambiguously which event is fi rst and which is second. Penrose 25 lists seven such directional processes:
(1) Th e decay of neutral K mesons in weak interactions. Of these processes (1), (3), (4) and (6) are experimentally very well confi rmed. (5) is very well confi rmed by introspection and by the descriptions of the psychology of mental processes. Th e claim that (2) is a directional process is -at least to a considerable extent -a matter of interpretation of the quantum mechanical process of measurement. Th e time reversal of (7), leading to a white hole (no experimental evidence so far) is an open question such that (7) cannot be viewed as an unambiguous case of a directional process. Furthermore it is an open question whether processes (1), (4), (6) and perhaps (7) can be reduced ultimately to process (3). 26 
